Op-ed: Sharing Strategic Geography: The Nordics Amid a Changing Security Reality

This is an op-ed written by an external contributor. All views expressed are the writer's own.

Although the Nordics have long faced different geographic directions for their own security and foreign policy priorities, today’s security reality has changed this geographic perception to one shared strategic geography. This adjustment is not one that can be instantly achieved and must be done purposefully. 

It requires time, a rethink of conventional defence planning logics, and recalibration of threat perceptions given the changing role of the U.S., the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO, and Russia’s continued war of aggression in Ukraine. 

A common refrain heard in northern Europe is that the security environment is rapidly changing. This often refers to the growing and more serious threat of Russia when it comes to hybrid threats or to the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO, which has shifted the calculus of the Arctic to seven NATO Arctic states and Russia. 

However, the security environment is not just changing due to external pressures but also describes how the Nordics themselves understand their own geographic position in the world. 

The Nordics have long cooperated together on defence matters. Foreign ministers met during the Cold War, although they ostensibly did not discuss security matters. Nordic soldiers worked together in a shared battalion during the 1990s Balkan conflicts, exercised together in aerial cross-border training since the early 2000s, and formed NORDEFCO in 2009 as a way to modernize forces in a cost-efficient manner. 

This calculus changed in 2014 after Russia’s annexation of Crimea towards a refocus on territorial defence. Since then, a surge of bilateral and minilateral agreements has occurred that cover everything from broad strategic cooperation to specific operational matters, both in and outside the Arctic. But what underlies this rapid change is a question of strategic geography.

A Shared Strategic Geography

The North should now be considered as having a shared strategic geography. Though the physical geography is not changing, the perception of how to defend this territory and the necessity of integrating together on matters of defence is. While an uninformed observer might ask whether this is anything new, it is a radically different approach for the region as a whole to fully integrate. 

Traditionally, each Nordic state has had different geographic focal points. While Norway has been oriented towards the High North and North Atlantic and Iceland to the North Atlantic, Denmark has been focused on the Danish Straits to the Baltic, and Finland and Sweden have both positioned themselves towards the Baltic. 

These differences in geographic foci naturally come with differences in how to invest in military domain capacities. For example, a Finnish or Swedish naval vessel that operates in the shallow waters of the Baltic is not one that is constructed for the Barents or High North. 

Norwegian efforts have been on operating in the Barents Sea. In an Arctic context, Finnish and Swedish engagement – minimal as they have been – are in a land capacity as neither state has Arctic coastline. While Danish investment has been on complementing American effortsthrough building expeditionary strength, Iceland has no military. 

The physical conditions of where states choose to invest deeply condition how they behave. In the case of the Nordics, this has real-life consequences for working together. Today, these focal points are changing. With Finnish and Swedish accession to NATO, there are now no barriers to full Nordic cooperation on defence planning. 

This has culminated in a change in how strategic military geography is understood in northern Europe. It is now not sufficient to focus on any one of these geographies, whether it be the Baltic, Barents, North Atlantic, or the High North. 

They must be integrated into a single threat image, which comes with both opportunities as well as challenges. This has already institutionally occurred with all the Nordics formally coming under the NATO Joint Force Command (JFC) Norfolk. Nordic states must allocate limited resources as feasibly as possible to cover the different theatres in a way that convincingly deters Russia.

Why does this matter?

Changing perspective and military practice takes time and effort. While it might seem as though Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO immediately changed the picture in the North, integrating and presenting a united front will take time. 

That said, the Nordics have an advantage. They have been cooperating in a security and defence capacity for some time, through NORDEFCO, and bilateral and minilateral arrangements, which are underlined by long-standing cultural and historical similarities. While domains differ in their interoperable nature, the aerial domain is one where there have been huge strides forward in integration.

Yet, NATO is only one part of the picture. To fully appreciate the changed reality, it matters to adopt a broader geographic perspective. That is because this is not just a question of Alliance politics and integration. It is a matter of military mobility, domain adjustments, and reconceptualizing how their individual homelands will be defended if the worst-case scenario arises. For example, Norway must shift from being the recipient of Allied reinforcements to being a transit country to Finland and Sweden. 

This begs questions of how militaries move across the Fennoscandian peninsula when there are infrastructural differences and different bureaucratic systems of total defence that make addressing such issues challenging. As one concrete example, Sweden and Norway both use the European Standard Gauge while Finland uses the wider Russian gauge. 

In practice, this means that supplies or other needed military equipment would need to be moved to a different track entirely upon entry into Finland. In a crisis situation, there may be little to no time to do this. A new EU initiative, ‘Military Schengen’, would help support Finland in making this track change so that military troops and equipment can be moved easily across the peninsula. However, again, this will take time and isn’t expected to start until the 2030s.

Where does Northern Europe End?

Questions about Nordic security and the role of Nordic states inherently beg the follow-up questions on the role of the Baltic states, the role of Germany, Poland, and even the UK in northern Europe. 

But this ever-expanding depiction of northern Europe comes with costs. Not every country is a natural partner for each Nordic state on all domains, geographic spaces, and types of threats. Rather than seeking a broad Nordic consensus, the shared strategic geography offers a spatial way to reorganize how the Nordics relate to one another on matters of the broadest strategic level, while offering space for the flexible and modular Nordic approach to foreign policy.

In this way, allies in northern Europe that are not Nordic still have a role to play. When considering the Baltic Sea, for example, the Baltic states, Poland, and Germany all have a place at the table. 

The North Atlantic theatre requires cooperation with the UK and the Canadians, and the Americans. A strategic geographic approach presupposes that certain spaces come with natural partners.

Reassessing Shared Strategic Spaces

The changed perception of the Nordics as a shared strategic space is not a switch to be turned on or off. Questions of strategy, operations, and tactics all require a rethink and reassessment both directly concerning NATO and multilateral Nordic cooperation. 

Much time and effort have already been spent on addressing some of the logistical and bureaucratic challenges that come with such a change. Yet this new reality of defensive planning for the Nordics is also an exciting and revelatory step forward for the region as a whole. 

This is not just a question of military integration, but a changed geographic way of thinking about the Nordics and northern Europe. In some ways, this will include other allies in the North on an issue-by-issue basis while also driving the Nordics even closer together. 

For deterring against Russia and signaling capability, there has never been a better time to be Nordic.